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RESEARCH & DEBATE
IS THE PSI REALLY THE CORNERSTONE OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL NORM?
Mark J. Valencia
This essay was written in response to the article “The Proliferation Security Ini-
tiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,” by Joel Doolin, published in
the Naval War College Review (Spring 2006, vol. 59, no. 2, pp. 29–57).
Doolin’s article contains some serious substantive flaws in interpretation,
logic, and conclusions. The general thrust and conclusion of the paper is that
through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) it has become or is becoming
customary international law to be able to interdict and board vessels on the high
seas without flag-state consent to search for and seize weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) and related materials. This contention, however, is not supported
by the relevant facts and is deleterious to the regime of freedom of navigation,
which the U.S. Navy has held sacrosanct and zealously defended for centuries.1
Doolin’s specific arguments marshaled to support the contention that inter-
diction of vessels on the high seas without flag-state consent has become or is
becoming customary international law include widespread support for the PSI,
state sovereignty in its territorial sea, an “overwhelming majority” of nations
having signed conventions “outlawing” the proliferation of WMD, United Na-
tions Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, and Article 51 of the UN Charter
(Right of Self-Defense). The following summarizes problems with these
arguments.
The paper repeats without analysis the U.S. government contention that “more
than sixty countries have signaled that they support the PSI and are ready to partic-
ipate in interdiction efforts” (page 31). As Sharon Squassoni of the U.S. Congres-
sional Research Service has pointed out, it is unclear what “support” for the PSI
means and how robust it is.2 The “concrete steps” for contribution to the PSI
listed on the U.S. State Department website are rather vague and conditional.3
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First and foremost, participating states are encouraged formally to commit to
and publicly endorse, if possible [my italics], the Statement of Interdiction Prin-
ciples. Follow-up steps are also replete with conditional language, such as “indi-
cate willingness,” “as appropriate,” “might contribute,” and “be willing to
consider.”
It is true that sixty-six countries attended a closed-door meeting in Warsaw
on 23 June 2006, marking the third anniversary of the initiation of the PSI.4
However, no list of participating countries has been made available, and the def-
inition of “supporting” countries remains unclear. Indeed, it is nigh impossible
to obtain an “official” list of PSI-supporting countries. Apparently this is because
some—perhaps many—so-called supporting states have not publicly endorsed
the PSI principles. Reasons given include not wanting to provoke North Korea,
wanting to avoid possible reprisals for cooperating with the United States,
fearing that interdictions on the high seas will jeopardize international trade
and undermine international law, and not perceiving the PSI as a top security
priority.5 This reluctance to publicly endorse the PSI principles in itself indicates
less than stalwart support in general, let alone in time of specific need. Indeed,
given the flexibility of cooperation, many if not most of the so-called supporters
would not automatically participate in interdictions of vessels or aircraft at the
behest of the United States. Thus, in a pinch, support could easily evaporate. In
any case, such soft support does not warrant a conclusion that PSI activities will
change international practice regarding interdiction on the high seas without
flag-state consent.
Moreover, while there is indeed a growing list of nations willing to associate
themselves with different aspects of the PSI on a case-by-case basis, support in
Asia—a major focus of proliferation concern—is weak. Despite considerable
U.S. pressure to participate fully and publicly, key countries like China, India,
Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia remain outside the “coalition of the willing,”
and the cooperation of others that have nominally joined, such as Japan, South
Korea, and Russia, for various reasons is lukewarm at best.
A state may “approach, visit, and search any vessel in its territorial sea and con-
tiguous zone” (page 35). Navigation in the territorial waters of any coastal state is
subject to the innocent-passage regime—that is, it is allowed as long as it is not
prejudicial to the coastal state’s peace, good order, or security.6 Specific non-
innocent acts are listed in the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the
Sea (1982 UNCLOS) Article 19, and transporting WMD components or missiles
is not among them. Moreover, the 1982 UNCLOS Article 23 implicitly gives ships
carrying nuclear weapons the right of innocent passage. These articles were a
U.S.-led compromise with those nations that wanted the Convention to explic-
itly declare carriage of nuclear weapons in foreign territorial seas to be
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non-innocent. Thus for a coastal state to legally interdict a vessel in its territorial
sea without flag-state consent because the vessel is thought to be carrying WMD
or related materials, the coastal state would probably have to have in place legis-
lation criminalizing WMD transport or demonstrate that the vessel is threaten-
ing its security due to the presence on board of WMD destined for persons
intending to undertake terrorist activities in areas under its jurisdiction.7 Per-
haps in a stretch the coastal state could argue that because the recipient of the
WMD is unknown, it has to assume they are bound for an enemy. But a coastal
state cannot, as the author contends, simply “approach, visit, and search any ves-
sel in its territorial sea.”
WMD are subject to seizure because “the overwhelming majority of nations have
signed treaties outlawing the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons” (page 37). “The NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], CWC [Chemi-
cal Warfare Convention], and BWC [Biological Weapons Convention] are argu-
ably enforceable against nonsignors. The implication for military operations would
seem to be that seizure of WMD items found aboard foreign ships or aircraft may be
authorized” (page 37). Doolin provides his own counterargument to this ex-
treme statement. “No interpretation is permitted when the text of a treaty is
clear—and none of the WMD or terrorism conventions authorizes maritime in-
terdiction. Each treaty was the product of negotiation by states, and subse-
quently changed security needs, however compelling, cannot add a right to
maritime interdiction that does not exist in its language” (page 38). Indeed!
UNSC Resolution 1540 strengthens the evolution of customary international
law toward accepting “the boarding of vessels on the high seas to search for
[WMD]” (page 51). Doolin hedges by implying that flag-state consent is still
needed. Indeed, this is made clear in the background to UNSC Resolution 1540.
In March 2004 the United States tried to obtain a UN Security Council reso-
lution specifically authorizing states to interdict, board, and inspect any vessel or
aircraft if there were reason to believe they were carrying WMD or the technol-
ogy to make or deliver them, and to seize or impound missiles or related tech-
nology or equipment. This was a difficult—and, as it turned out, frustrating—
tacit admission by the United States that it needs a UN mandate to legitimize
high-seas PSI interdictions.
There were several initial objections to the draft. Foremost was the question
of what constitutes “weapons-related materials”—a definitional problem that
continues to undermine the legitimacy of the PSI. Another particular area of de-
bate was the text’s proposal that parties “to the extent consistent with their na-
tional legal authorities and international law” cooperate on preventing, and if
necessary interdicting, shipments of WMD and related materials. In other
words, the United States sought UN support for PSI interdictions. The text did
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not include a British proposal for a UN counterproliferation committee or a
French proposal for a permanent corps of UN weapons inspectors. In other
words, according to the U.S. proposal, enforcement would be outside the UN
system.
After considerable debate in and outside the Security Council, a revised draft
resolution emerged that asked all UN members to “criminalize” the prolifera-
tion of WMD, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials
within their own borders.8 The final resolution that emerged after further debate
was introduced to the Security Council on 24 March 2004 and passed on 28
April 2004 (UNSCR 1540). It requires all 191 UN members to “adopt and en-
force appropriate effective laws to prevent any nonstate actor from being able to
manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport or use nuclear, chemical or bi-
ological weapons and their means of delivery.”9 Specifically, it compels all coun-
tries to adopt laws to criminalize the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to
ensure that they have strong export controls, and to secure sensitive materials
within their borders.10
Significantly, Russia and China prevented a specific endorsement of interdic-
tion and the PSI in the resolution.11 Indeed, the text was agreed upon only after
the United States accepted China’s demand under a threat of a veto to drop a
provision specifically authorizing the interdiction of vessels suspected of trans-
porting WMD, a cornerstone of the PSI. China also objected to any suggestion
that the Council would endorse ad hoc frameworks like the PSI.
With these amendments, China, France, and Russia supported the revised
draft. However, a vote was delayed because Council members wanted every UN
member state to be briefed on the resolution.12 Ironically, Pakistan, a prominent
U.S. ally in the war on terror, led opposition to the resolution until it was assured
it would not be retroactive and a provision allowing intrusive inspections was
deleted.13 Opponents of the resolution were also concerned by the Security
Council’s assumption of the authority essentially to make national law and by
possible sanctions against UN members that do not comply. They also objected
to the secret and arrogant manner in which the text was negotiated among only
the Permanent Five before its introduction. In the end, the resolution did little to
strengthen the effectiveness of the PSI, since it focused only on nonstate actors
and did not clearly authorize interdiction or any action outside current inter-
national law.
Without a clearly worded UNSC resolution specifically authorizing high-seas
interdiction, any such interdiction over the objection of the flag state would be
tantamount to aggression and could be considered an act of war. Even if a coun-
try were to enforce the PSI principles only in its own territorial waters, each
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interdiction may require Security Council approval,14 or only be legal in very
specific circumstances.
Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, supports the goals
of the PSI.15 But he would prefer that such issues and actions be addressed and
undertaken collectively through and by the United Nations.16 He has said that
the Security Council must be “the sole source of legitimacy on the use of force.”17
Other core PSI members such as France favor this approach and have proposed a
Security Council summit meeting to frame a UN action plan against prolifera-
tion and to create a corps of inspectors to carry it out.
Article 51 of the UN Charter could be used “as a trump card” [to interdict with-
out flag-state consent vessels on the high seas carrying WMD] (page 46). Pre-
emptive self-defense includes anticipatory self-defense and preventive
self-defense.18 For an action to be compatible with current international legal in-
terpretations of anticipatory self-defense, the United States and its coalition
partners would probably have to demonstrate not only that the interdicted cargo
required such action because it posed a specific and imminent threat of attack
on the United States or its allies, but also that the necessity of self-defense was in-
stant and overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no time for delibera-
tion.19 That is, a response was necessary, proportional to the threat, and the
threat was imminent.20 Otherwise such action and argument would be greatly
expanding the traditional definition of self-defense to include preemptive
self-defense regarding non-imminent threats and would set a very dangerous
precedent that could undermine the very foundations of the United Nations. In
fact, Article 51 provides the right of self-defense only in the case of an armed at-
tack, and only until the UN “Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.”21
Doolin himself acknowledges that “universal condemnation of [WMD] and
terrorism cannot be used as justification for violation of another state’s sover-
eignty” (page 48). Indeed, as he says, the only time national defense could be
used to justify maritime interdiction on the high seas without flag-state consent
would be “if the facts established that the transport of [WMD] toward the
coastal nation constituted an imminent threat of an armed attack” (page 48).
In sum, the underpinnings of Doolin’s argument are not substantiated. Interna-
tional law does not permit high-seas interdictions and boardings without flag-
state consent except in very specific circumstances that do not include transport
of “WMD, related materials and delivery systems.” It is highly questionable
whether such interdictions are allowed even for a vessel in innocent passage in
the territorial sea. Neither the PSI, existing nonproliferation treaties and weap-
ons conventions, UNSC Resolution 1540, nor Article 51 support interdiction on
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the high seas in violation of the freedom-of-navigation regime. Such interdic-
tion without flag-state consent is not, and is not likely in the foreseeable future
to become, customary international law.
As for amending Article 110 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea as suggested by Doolin (pages 50, 51), the United States as a non-party has
no official role in the matter. Indeed, one of the most egregious inconsistencies
of this piece is that it frequently cites the 1982 UNCLOS to support its argu-
ments. The United States is not a party to this grand bargain and cannot “pick
and choose” which provisions it will follow.
The sad fact is that the PSI and ancillary measures have done little or nothing
to restrict the movement of WMD and closely related materials on flagged ships
and planes of North Korea, Iran, or other “countries of proliferation concern,”
especially those owned and operated by their governments.22 Another sad fact is
that the implementation, if not the conception, of the PSI was and is seriously
flawed. Yet the PSI’s proponents and its defenders continue to ignore many of its
problems and to exaggerate its progress and effectiveness.
All this is not to say that trade in WMD and related items should be ignored,
although it may not be possible to prevent it altogether. To help nonconsensual
high-seas interdictions for WMD transport to become customary international
law, wider and more robust state support is required. To engender this support,
the PSI’s shortcomings must be acknowledged and addressed. Most of the PSI’s
shortcomings stem from its ad hoc, extra–United Nations, U.S.-driven nature.
Bringing it into the UN system would rectify many of these shortcomings by
loosening U.S. control, enhancing the initiative’s legitimacy, and engendering
near-universal support. Whether or not the PSI is formally brought into the UN
system, its reach and effectiveness could be improved by eliminating hypocrisy
and double standards (e.g., when it comes to India, Pakistan, and Israel), and in-
creasing transparency. Needed is a neutral organization to assess intelligence,
coordinate and fund activities, and to make decisions regarding specific or ge-
neric interdictions. Such an organization could provide more objective and le-
gitimate definitions of states “of proliferation concern” and “good cause” (for
interdiction). It would also help avoid erroneous judgments, resolve disagree-
ments, provide consistency and a concrete structure and budget, and ensure
compliance with international law—or be a vehicle for any agreed changes
therein.
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Parts of this commentary are derived from
Mark J. Valencia, The Proliferation Security
Initiative: Making Waves in Asia, Adelphi
Paper 376 (London: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, October 2005).
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and several of its relevant components are
also enshrined in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Freedom
of the high seas comprises among others the
freedoms of navigation and of overflight (art.
87 and art. 90). The right of visit is severely
constrained (art. 110). Ships on the high seas
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
flag state (art 92). And ships owned or oper-
ated by a state, and used only on government
noncommercial service, shall, on the high
seas, have complete immunity from the juris-
diction of any other state (art. 96).
2. Sharon Squassoni, “Proliferation Security Ini-
tiate,” Congressional Research Service, 7 June
2005, Order Code RS21881.
3. U.S. State Dept., The Proliferation Security
Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of
Nonproliferation, 26 May 2005), available at
www.state.gov/E/np/rls/fs/46839.htm.
4. “Proliferation Security Initiative High Level
Political Meeting,” Cracow, Warsaw, 23 June
2006, available at www.psi.msz.gov.p1/.
5. Brendon Pearson, “Tokyo Treads Warily in
Use of Interdiction Force,” Australian Finan-
cial Review, 12 July 2003; Takashi Ono and
Yoshiro Mino, “Japan Nervous as Star of
WMD and Exercise,” Asahi Shimbun, 15 Sep-
tember 2003; “Russian Diplomat Says Inter-
ception Training May Prolong Nuclear
Crisis,” ABCNews Radio Online (Australia), 11
September 2003; “China Voices Concern over
WMD Non-proliferation Plan’s Legality,” 9
December 2003, as quoted in Andreas Persbo
and Ian Davis, “Sailing into Uncharted Wa-
ters: The Proliferation Security Initiative and
the Law of the Sea,” BASIC Research Report
2004, 2 June 2004, available at www.basicint
.org/pubs/Research/04PSI.htm; Ye Ru’an and
Zhao Qinghai, “The PSI: Chinese Thinking
and Concern,” Monitor 10, no. 1 (Spring
2004), p. 23; Stephen Rademaker, Assistant
U.S. Secretary of State for Arms Control,
Testimony before the House Internal Rela-
tions Committee, Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Terrorism and Nonproliferation,
Washington D.C., 9 June 2005, available at
www.State.gov/t/ac/rls/rm/47715.htm.
6. United Nations, Official Text of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(New York, 1983), Article 19, available at
ww.un.or/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
texts/unclos/closindx.htm.
7. Natalino Ronzitti, “The Law of the Sea and
the Use of Force against Terrorist Activities,”
in Maritime Terrorism and International Law,
ed. Natalino Ronzitti (New York: Kluwer Law
International, 1990), pp. 1–15; Benjamin
Friedman, “The Proliferation Security Initia-
tive: The Legal Challenge,” Bipartisan Security
Group, 4 September 2003, available at www.fas
.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm.
8. Mark Turner, “U.S. Drafts UN Move to Re-
duce Flow of Weapons,” Financial Times, 18
December 2003.
9. Colum Lynch, “U.S. Urges Curb on Arms
Traffic,” Washington Post, 25 March 2004, p.
A20; Jim Wust, “U.N. Draft Resolution Could
Require States Deny Terrorists WMD,” U.N.
Wire, 25 March 2004.
10. Maggie Farley, “Resolution Seeks Ban on
Spread of Weapons,” Los Angeles Times, 29
April 2004.
11. Ralph Cossa, introduction to “Countering
the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
The Role of the Proliferation Security Initia-
tive,” Issues and Insights 4, no. 5 (July 2004),
pp. 1–6.
12. Evelyn Leopold, Reuters, 25 March 2004.
13. William Varner, “Pakistan Leads Opposition
at UN to Terrorism Measure,” Bloomberg, 5
April 2004; Daily Times, editorial, 1 May
2004.
14. Foreign Policy Association, Proliferation Se-
curity Initiative: Principles and Practices, 7
September 2003.
15. “World Leaders Urged to Act Boldly,” Finan-
cial Express, 22 March 2005.
16. “Listen to Annan,” International Herald Tri-
bune, 26 September 2003, p. 8.
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17. Quoted in John R. Bolton, “Remarks at Prolif-
eration Security Meeting,” Paris, France, avail-
able at www.state.gov/t/us/rm/23801.htm.
18. Anticipatory self-defense is an attack upon
another state that actively threatens violence
and has the capacity to carry out the threat
but has not yet done so; preventive self-
defense is an attack against another state
when a threat is feared or suspected but there
is no evidence that the threat is imminent.
Daniel H. Joyner, “The PSI and International
Law,” Monitor 10, no. 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 7–9.
19. Gerald F. Seib, “A Bush Doctrine Is Put in
Jeopardy by Weapons Hunt,” Asian Wall
Street Journal, 9 October 2003; Robert A.
Hamilton, “International Maritime Expert:
Law Supports War on Terror—German Law
School Vice Dean Speaks to Coast Guard
Class,” The Day website, 9 November 2003.
20. Ibid.
21. United Nations, “Charter of the United Na-
tions,” chap. VI, art. 51.
22. UNSC Resolution 1695 of 15 July 2006 does
prohibit all UN member states from provid-
ing to or receiving from North Korea WMD
and related materials or technology, specifi-
cally including missiles. But this resolution
was passed after the Doolin paper was pub-
lished. Besides, it is not part of the PSI (al-
though it has similar objectives), it does not
authorize the use of military force to ensure
compliance, and it does not apply to other
states seeking or supplying WMD-related
materials (except to North Korea). Edith M.
Lederer, “U.N. Imposes Limited Sanctions on
N. Korea,” Associated Press, 15 July 2006;
Warren Hoge, “U.N. Demands End to North
Korean Missile Program,” New York Times,
15 July 2006. Although the United States in-
sists that the resolution is “mandatory” and
“binding” and that all UN member states are
“required” to comply, it is unclear if and how
it will be enforced. “UN Resolution on North
Korea Result of Multilateral Efforts,” USINFO,
available at www.state.gov, 16 July 2006;
“U.S., Japan Turn Up Heat on N. Korea,”
Asahi.com, 18 July 2006; Kwang-Am Cheon,
“U.S. Mulls Own Sanctions on N. Korea,”
Asahi.com, 24 July 2006. Moreover, enforce-
ment by military means would be counter to
both the intent of the compromise Resolution
and to the 1982 UNCLOS.
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